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HomeMy WebLinkAbout6.3 OrdCommVehFrmResDist CITY OF DUBLIN AGENDA STATEMENT City Council. Meeting Date: August 10, 1987 SUBJECT: Public Hearing: Ordinance Prohibiting Certain Commercial Vehicles From Residence Districts (3-Ton Weight Limit) EXHIBITS ATTACHED: (1) Draft Ordinance (2) Excerpts from California Vehicle Code RECOMMENDATION: (1) Open Public Hearing (2) Receive Staff report and public testimony (3) Question Staff and the public (4) Close Public Hearing and deliberate (5) Waive reading and introduce ordinance FINANCIAL STATEMENT: Approximately $300 for installation of signs. DESCRIPTION: This proposed ordinance would impose a three-ton weight limit for commercial vehicles on all City streets in residence districts, as defined by the California Vehicle Code. The intent of the ordinance is (1) to prevent excess wear- and-tear on City streets, thus lessening repair costs in the future; and (2) to create a safer environment in residential neighborhoods by. allowing only those commercial vehicles over three tons which have a purpose for using the street. At the present time, only three City streets have three-ton weight limits: Davona Drive, Amador Valley Boulevard (between Village Parkway and Dougherty Road) , and Bandon Drive. This ordinance would permit vehicles using the street as the most feasible route for purposes of pickup or delivery within the residential neighborhood, as well as passenger buses or school buses, garbage collection vehicles, and utility company vehicles engaged in repair or installation of public utilities. A recreational vehicle or passenger vehicle used for hire (for example, a vanpool vehicle) is not considered a commercial vehicle by CVC definition. Upon adoption of the proposed ordinance, signs would be posted at City entrances which indicate a three-ton weight limit restriction exists on all residential streets. Staff recommends that the City Council conduct a public hearing, waive the reading, and introduce the ordinance prohibiting certain commercial vehicles from residence districts. ITEM NO. 6 COPIES TO: City of San Ramon TJKM ORDINANCE NO. -87 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF DUBLIN PROHIBITING CERTAIN COMMERCIAL VEHICLES FROM RESIDENCE DISTRICTS The City Council of the City of Dublin does ordain as fo]lows: ARTICLE 1. DEFINITIONS Section 1. COMMERCIAL VEHICLES PROHIBITED IN RESIDENCE DISTRICTS. No person shall operate any commercial vehicle, as said term is defined in the California Vehicle Code, having a gross weight, including load, in excess of three tons on any street within any residence district, as said term is defined in the California Vehicle Code, in the City, provided signs are in place at City entrances giving notice of this prohibition. Section 2. EXCEPTION - PICKUPS AND DELIVERIES. Section 1 shall not prohibit any commercial vehicles coming from an unrestricted street having ingress and egress by direct route to and from a restricted street when necessary for the purpose of making pickups or deliveries of goods, wares, and merchandise from or to any building or structure located on the restricted street or for the purpose of delivering materials to be used in the actual and bona fide repair, alteration, rmodeling, or construction of any 'building or structure upon the restricted street for which a building permit has previously been obtained. "Direct route," as used in this section, means the most feasible route from the closest unrestricted street consistent with the intent to limit the use of streets in the residence districts of the City by commercial vehicles. Section 3. EXCEPTIONS - MISCELLANEOUS. The prohibition contained in Section 1 shall not apply to the following types of vehicles: (a) (b) (c) (d) Passenger buses under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission; Any vehicle owned by a public utility while necessarily in'use in the construction, instailation, or repair of any public utility; School buses while carrying students to and from school; Motor vehicles designed by the manufacturer for the transportation and collection of garbage, rubbish, or refuse, and which are used regularly for such collection and transportation by any person any governmental entity engaged in the business of or in providing the service of collecting, transporting, and disposing of garbage, rubbish, or refuse. Section 4. POSTING OF ORDINANCE. The City Clerk of the City of Dublin shall cause this Ordinance to be posted in at ]east three (3) public places in the City of Dub]in in accordance with Section 36933 of the Government Code of the State of California. of PASSED AND ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Dublin on this , 1987. th day AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ATTEST: Mayor City C]erk fi)DE t0~er ik or ~the t~icle 1~. VEHICLE CODE § 280 § 233. Bus A "bus" is any motor vehicle, other than a motortruck or truck tractor, designed for carrying more than 10 persons including the driver, and used or maintained for the transportation of passengers, except that * * * a vanpool vehicle, as defined in Section 668~ and any motor vehicle, other than a motortruck or truck tractor, designed for carrying not more than 15 persons, including the driver, when the driver is transporting only members of the household otr~he owner thereof shall not be considered to be a bus for the purposes of this section. (Amended by Stats.1976, c. 844, p. 1923, § 1; Stats.1982, c. 46, p. ]39, § 4.) Cro~ References Bus, defined, air resources, ~ee Health and Safety Code § 39017. § 242. camp trailer A "camp trailer" is a vehicle designed to be used on a highway, capable of human habitation for camping or recreational purposes, that does not exceed 16 feet in overall length from the foremost point of the trailer hitch to the rear extremity of the trailer body and does not exceed 96 inches in width and includes any tent trailer. Where a trailer telescopes for travel, the size shall apply to the trailer as fully extended. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a camp trailer shall not be deemed to be a trailer coach. (Added by Stats. 1971, c. 1536, p. 3042, § 1, operative May 3, 1972.) Library References Automobiles ~=! 1. , C.LS. Motor Vehicle~ § 20 et seq. § 260. Commercial vehicle (a) A "commercial vehicle" is a vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. (b) Passenger vehicles which are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit and housecars are not commercial vehicles. This subdivision shall not apply to Chapter 4 (commencing at Section 6700) of Division 3. (c) Any vanpool vehicle is not a commercial vehicle. . (Amended by Stats.1982, c. 46, p. 139, § 5.) Notes of Decisions vehicle is one in which persons or property are transported I. In general for hire. Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Carrier Ins. Co. Within this section, the term "for hire" modified the word (1975) 119 Cai. Rptr. 116, 45 C.A.3d 223. .~.~"transportatlon," rather than "vehicle," so that commercial § 267. Repealed by Stats.1986, e. 973, § 1 The repealed section, added by Stats. 1984, c. 270, § I, defined cotton module mover. See, now, § 36012. · § 273. Crib sheet or cribbing device A "crib sheet" or "cribbing device" is any paper or device designed for cheating by supplying examination answers without questions to an applicant for the purpose of fraudulently qualifying the applicant for any class of driver's license, permit, or certificate. (Added by Stats.1986, c. 960, § 1.) § 280. Darkness "Darkness" is any time from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise and any other time when visibility is not sufficient to render clearly discernible any person or vehicle on the highway at a distance of* * * 1,000 feet. (Amended by State.1974, c. 635, p. 1488, § 1.) Asterisks * * * Indicate deletlone by amendment Div. 1 WORDS ANn PHRASES DEFINED § 515 § 5 10. Repair shop A "repair shop" is a place where vehicles subject to registration under this code are repaired, rebuilt, reconditioned, repainted, or in any way maintained for the public at a charge. (Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1536, § 510.) Historical Note Derivation: Stats. Z923, c. 266, p. 520, 9 Veh.C.1935, 9 76, added by Stats.1937, c. oD 229, p. 527, 9 1. 2~i; Stats.1927, c. 752, p. 14~., 9 6. Cross References Liens for repair ot~ motor vehicles, see Civil Code § 3067 et seq. Records and reports required, see 9 ]0650 et seq. Aatomobiles Library References C.$.S. Motor Vehicles § 715. § 515. Residence district A "residence district" is that portion of a highway and the prop- erty contiguous thereto, other than a business district, (a) upon one side of which highway, within a distance of a quarter of a mile, the contiguous property fronting thereon is occupied by 13 or more sepa- rate dwelling houses or business structures, or (b) upon both sides of which highway, collectively, within a distance of a quarter of a mile, the contiguous property fronting thereon is occupied by 16 or more separate dwelling houses or business structures. A residence district may be longer than one-quarter of a mile if the above ratio of sepa- rate dwelling houses or business structures to the length of the high- way exists. (Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1536, § 515.) Code Commission Notes--1935 See note to § 89 [now § 235]. Historical Note Derivation: Stats.1923, e. 266, p. 517, § Veh. C.1935, § 90 iSt~ts.1935, e. 27, p. °el',i'_,, added Stats.1929, c. 253, p. 510, 9 7. 99.) Cross References Business and residence districts, determination, see § 240. Business district defined, see § 235. Lights on parked vehicles in residential district, see 9 24802.. Limitations in determining whether highway is within a residential distriet, see 9 240. Speed limits in residential district, see § 22352 (b). Speed restriction signs in residential district, see 99 21357,21358, 41100. Automobiles ~::~5(4), 7. Library References O.J.£% Motor Vehicle8 § 29. 95 § 51,5 WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED Div. 1 Notes of Decisions Areas constituting residence district 2 Construction and application I Instructions 4 Jury questions 3 I. Construction and application Omission of words "at least" by later statute, this section, from curlier statute, Stats.1929, p. 510, § 28~/~(b), defining a residence district as the territory contig- uous to public highway when property fronting on one side of highway for dis- tance of "at least" a quarter of a mile is occupied by tblrteen or more separate dwelling bouses or business structures, or where property fronting on botb sides collectively of highway for "at least" a quarter of a mile is occupied by sixteen or more separate dwelling houses or bust- ness structures, did not control meaning of earlier act so as to require that same ratio be maintained throughout length of highway traversing district for six-tenths of a mile in order to constitute it a rest- deuce district. Rodkey v. City of Escon- dido (1937) 67 P.2d 1053, 8 C.2d 685. In personal injury action, arising out of accident occurring prior to 1{)53 amend- ment of Veh. C.1935, § 511, absence of evi- dence, to show that speed limit signs had been in place at entrance to alleged resi- dential district or at entrance to contig- uous residential district, justified trial court's refusal to give requested instruc- tion on existence of prima facie speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour. Garb bahli v. Botchers Bros. (1057) 309 P.2d 23, 48 C.2d 283. In national guardsmen's actions for in- juries sustained when struck by automo- bile while guardsmen were drilling, de- fendants lind burden to prove contributory negligence of guardsmen by showing that guardsmen were walking "along and upon" highway outside of a business or residen- tial district in manner prohibited by stat- ute. Armstrong v. 8engo (1936) 61 P.2d 1188, 17 O.A.2d 300. Use and occupancy of territory contig- uous to public bighway is controlling fac- tot in fixing nature of district as "rest- deuce" or "business" within speed. Add- an v. Guyette (1936) 58 P.2d 988, 14 C. A.2d 493. 2. Areas constituting residence district An area, to be a residential district wherein Veb.C.1935, § 511, limits vehicle speed to 25 miles per hour, must both be signposted as such district and bare num- ber of buildings required by this section. Noble v. Kertz & Sons Feed & Fuel Co. (1946) 164 P.2d 257, 72 C.A.2d 153. Where pedestrian was not able to show required 13 structures in zone within one-fourth mile of entrance us required by this section, zone could not be declared a "residence district" so as to permit pedes- trian to walk on either side of blghway without being guilty of contributory negli- gence when struck by automobile, by showing ratio of more than 13 structures for area between two signposts, since "ra- tio'' provision' in said section merely means that failure of properly marked residence district to have required number of structures at certain point wouhl not l,revent entire district from being a resi- dence district. MeGough v. Hendrickson (1943) :!36 P.2d 110, 58 C.A.2d 60. Where Veh. C.1935, § 465 et seq., at time of automobile accident, required a speed limit sign to be posted at entrance to residential district, and pedestrian was injured by an automobile within area cov- ered by a speed limit sign, and jury found only 12 separate structures within the area, and, under this seclton, thirteen structures were necessary to constitute the area a residence district, jury was justified in finding that speed limit sign was not erected at the entrance to a resi- dence district. Ill. This section, providing that a residence district may be longer than one-fourth mile if the "ratio" of 13 structures exists the length of tile highway, does not mean that by signposting a ~nunicipality can in* elude in a residential district an area on tile edge thereof that does not {!omply with tile statutory requiremenls, lint means that once a residential distri~'t properly starts and ends with proper signs, the fact that itl between there might ]tot be the requisite number of structures at a particular point will not prevent tile entire, district from being a "residence district". Itl. A road is not within a business or resi- dential district within Veb.C.1935, § 511 establishing speed limit on roads in such a district, unless it appears that there is within the district the required density of structures and tbat district is signposted at the boundary lines thereof. Cavalli v. Luekett (19t0) 10~ P.2d 708, 40 C.A.2d 250. Where front doors of dwelling and ga- rage located on lot bounded by street, on which automobile accident occurred and by two other streets, faced one of other sm.h streets and were connected therewitll by walk Ired driveway, property frontcd on flUCil street aml not on street ou which accident occurred and hence, latter strcet was not wltbin "residence district" within Stats.1929, p. 510, § 28~fi2, where street bad only fifteen separate dwellings or 96 l)iv. I)usi~ mile ( 1 3. J is spce~ Veh.~ onc ] Sons 257, distr! tiguo ness ,of h' whiul slilnl said wslk 110, ~ Wh whet/ iu 1 h trian in tho i Id. Wh IUhl I A,h i. ( '..\.:' ill \vn b' Div. '1 business l,ouses fronting on one-fourth mile in question. Adrian v. Guyette (1936) 58 P.2d 988, 14 C.A.2d 493. 3. Jury questions A disputed question as to whether area is residential district, wherein vehicle speed is limited to :25 miles per hour by Veh.C.1935, § 511, is one of fact and not one for judicial notice. Noble v. Kertz & Sons Feed & Fuel Co. (1946) 164 P.2d 257, 72 C.A.2d 153. Under this section, defining a "residence district" as portion of highway and con- tiguous property within quarter-mile dis- tanse if occupied by 13 dwellings or "busi- ness structures", whether cleaning and dyeing establishment, run as a single busi- ness under a single ownership consisting of two buildings joined by driveway over which an overhead was constructed, con- stituted two business structures within said section so as to permit n pedestrian struck by an automobile in such district to walk on either side of the highway with- out being guilty of contributory negli- gence, was properly submitted to the jury. McGougb v. Hendrickson (19t3) 36 P.2d 110, 58 C.A.2d 60. Where tile nature of a district, snell as whether it is business or residential with- in this section, so as to permit a pedes- trian to walk on either side of the high- way witlmut being guilty of contributory negligence if struck by an automobile, is in dispute, the trial court should submit the issue as to its character to the jury. Id. Where evidence ns to number of sepa- rate dwellings or business houses fronting on street at place of automobile accident was not conflicting, submission of issues whether street wus in residence distriet and permissible speed tl~ereon was error. Adrian v. Guyette (1936) 58 P.2d 988, 14 C.A.2d 493. In action for injuries to child struck by auto stage while attempting to cross street, question, whether point at which accident occurred lay within residence dis- trict, as defined in Vehicle Act, Stats. 1923, p. 554, § 114, as amended by Stats. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED § 525 1927, p. 1437, § 31, limiting speed to 20 miles an hour in residence district, was for jury, where signs were placed in dis- trict limiting speed limit under § 116; it being presumed that official duty was reg- ularly perforlned under C.C.P. § 1963, subd. 15 (repealed. See, now, Evid. C. § 664). Galwey v. Pacific Auto Stages (192,q) 273 P. 866, 96 C.A. 169. 4. Idstructlons In prosecution for manslaughter arising out of unlawful operation of an automo- bile giving of instructions on violation of speed limit in a residence district without giving the qualifying limitations of Veh.C. 1985, § 90.1, was not prejudieial, in view of evidence that defendant was violating basic speed law and blind interseetion statute. People v. Kemp (1957) 310 P.2d 680, 150 C.A.2d 654. Instruction submitting to jury question whether automobile collision, eausing inju- ries to plaintiff, occurred in residential district, was not prejudicial to defendant, though plaintiff failed to show that dis- trier was signposted as residence district, in view of defendant's admissions, another instruction, and plaintiff's evidence, tlill v. Fresno County (1934) 35 P.2d 593, 140 C.A. 272. Instruction that plaintiff was negligent as matter of law if jury found "frmn tbe evidence" that plaintiff walked along high- way outside of business or residence dis- trict otherwise than close to bis iefthami side thereof was properly refused, absent evidence that automobile accident occurred within or without business or residential district. Pisani v. Martini (1933) 22 P.2d 80 t, 132 C.A. 269. Failure to instruct what constituted res- idence district was not prejudicial, under evidence showing place of automobile acci- dent was not residential district. Cnn- ningham v. Cox (1932) 15 P.2d 169, 126 C.A. 6S5. ~Vbere automobile accident occurred out- side residence district, rulings and failure to instruct, if leading jury to believe dis- trier was residence district, was not prej- udicial to plaintiff. Id. § 525. Right-of-way "Right-of-way" is the privilege of the immediate use of the high- way. (Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1536, § 525.) Derivation: Stats.1923, c. 266, p. 520, § 24; Veb.C.1935, § 87 (Stats.1935, c. 27, p. ~9.) Cross References Right of way in general, see §§ 21800 et seq., 21950 et seq.